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Should We Get Married? The Effect of Parents’ Marriage on Out-of-Wedlock Children
Using a representative sample of children all born to unwed parents drawn from the Fragile Fam-
ilies and Child Wellbeing Study (FFCWS), we investigate whether marriage after childbirth has a
causaleffecton earlychildcognitiveability, usinga treatmentoutcomeapproach toaccount forself-
selection into marriage. Comparing children with similar background characteristics and parental
mate-selection patterns who differ only in terms of whether their parents marry after childbirth,
marriage between unwed biological parents leads to a four point increase in their child’s Peabody









While marriage remains the foundation of family life in the U.S., the traditional process of fam-
ily formation, speciﬁcally marriage before having children, has been dwindling. The proportion of
children born to unwed parents has increased dramatically over the past three decades, from 12% in
1970 to nearly one-third of all births today (Sigle-Rushton and McLanahan, 2002b). The decoupling
of marriage and fertility behavior is particularly common among the low-income, less-educated ur-
ban population (Sigle-Rushton and McLanahan, 2002a; Manning and Brown, 2003; McLanahan and
Sandefur, 1994). Unmarried parents tend to have fewer resources, and children raised by unwed parents
tend to display inferior outcomes compared to those raised by two married parents.1
Concerned over the rise of out-of-wedlock parenthood and its implications on children involved,
recent policies have geared toward promoting marriage among unmarried parents.2 However, very
little is known about the potential beneﬁts of marriage after childbirth. Couples who have children
out-of-wedlock are known to be selectively different from those who marry before having children.
Unmarried parents tend to be of lower socioeconomic standing, face poorer prospects in the marriage
market, and may be less assortatively matched (Brown, 2004; Osborne and McLanahan, 2004; Nock,
1998; Rosenzweig, 1999; Jaffe and Chacon-Puignau, 1995; Garﬁnkel et al., 2002). Hence, interpreting
differences in child outcomes found in cross sectional comparisons between children born to married
vs. unmarried parents as beneﬁts of marriage could be misleading, as these differences may largely
reﬂect the advantages of married parents rather than the intrinsic beneﬁts of marriage.
This study examines whether marriage after having children has a causal effect on child cognitive
ability, using data on a representative sample of children all born to unmarried parents drawn from
the Fragile Families and Child Wellbeing Study (FFCWS). In this sample, a signiﬁcant percentage
of children born out-of-wedlock experience the marriage of their (biological) parents. To determine
whether marriage after having children has a causal effect on child cognitive development, our em-
pirical strategy centers around a treatment outcome framework similar to an experiment where the
treatment (“marriage after childbirth”) is randomly assigned. We draw on matching methods (Rubin,
1979; Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983; Heckman and Hotz, 1989; Heckman et al., 1997, 1998) to iden-
2tify the treatment effect (marriage), exploiting the full information provided by the rich set of parental
characteristics in the FFCWS. Our approach addresses the selection into marriage by constructing the
appropriate comparison group for children whose parents marry after childbirth. We ﬁrst estimate the
probability of marriage among unwed parents with a newborn, then compare cognitive outcomes of
children whose parents share similar probabilities of marriage.
The treatment outcome framework is a (semi) nonparametric method that does not impose func-
tional form assumptions on the relationship between the treatment (“marriage”) and the outcome in
question, allowing for the separate identiﬁcation of the treatment effects for the treated. In comparison,
the linearity assumption of the conventional regression approach permits data from all observations to
be combined into one estimate, generating a complex average of the treatment effect on the treated (“ef-
fect of marriage on children whose parents marry”), and the treatment effect on children whose parents
are unlikely to ever marry. The validity of such estimates is suspect when the combining function oper-
ates over children born to couples with very different characteristics (i.e., when unmarried couples with
substantially different characteristics from those who marry are used to estimate the counterfactual).
We investigate potential differential marriage effects by comparing estimates from treatment outcome
models to least squares results.
In the estimation, we utilize information on the unwed biological father that is rarely available in
large representative datasets. The extent to which children beneﬁt from their parents transitioning into
marriage may depend on each parent’s characteristics (“traits”) and how well these traits are matched
(“positive assortative mating”). While some studies examine the determinants of (marital) union for-
mation among single mothers (Furstenberg et al., 1987; Graefe and Lichter, 2002; Aassve, 2003), the
factors inﬂuencing marriage and the patterns of assortative mating between unmarried biological par-
ents are considerably less well understood.3 This is mainly due to the lack of information on men who
father children out-of-wedlock.4 Confronted with the “missing fathers problem”, studies typically ac-
count for selection into marriage by controlling for the characteristics of the resident parent (usually the
mother) and assume that the mating patterns of unmarried parents are similar to those of married par-
ents (Astone and McLanahan, 1991; Wu, 1996; Painter and Levine, 2000).5 To the extent that the effect
3of parents’ marriage on child wellbeing reﬂects the characteristics both parents as well as the quality of
their match, existing estimates of the effect of marriage among unwed parents may be biased.6
Data from the FFCWS is used to estimate the effect of marriage on child ability among out-of-
wedlock children. The FFCWS provides child assessment data and detailed marriage, fertility, and
socioeconomic information on both biological parents of a large representative sample of children born
outside of marriage. We focus on the effect of marriage among parents who are romantically involved
(cohabiting or visiting7) at birth on child cognitive ability measured at age three, based on scores from
the Peabody Picture Vocabulary Test (PPVT), a widely-used interviewer-administered measure of re-
ceptive hearing and verbal ability. Much of the existing evidence on the effects of family structure and
child outcome stems from studies using data on the wellbeing of school-age children and adolescents.
Since unmarried families tend to be less stable and hence more short-lived (Bumpass and Lu, 2000;
Manning et al., 2004), these ﬁndings may be characteristic of stable unmarried families only. Hence,
by focusing on marital transitions within a short period after childbirth, our sample may be more rep-
resentative of the overall population of unmarried families. We ﬁnd that children whose parents marry
after childbirth score about four points (1=4th of a standard deviation) higher on the PPVT at age three,
compared to children of persistently unmarried parents with similar observable characteristics.
II. BACKGROUND
While there exists an extensive body of research on the relationship between family structure and
child wellbeing, the effect of marriage between unwed biological parents on child outcomes has re-
ceived little attention. This section provides the conceptual and empirical background for analyzing the
effects of marriage on child wellbeing, with special emphasis on how marriage between the biologi-
cal parents may beneﬁt children born out-of-wedlock. We draw on the theoretical literature on family
formation and resource allocation (Becker, 1965, 1973, 1991; Manser and Brown, 1980; McElroy and
Horney, 1981; Weiss and Willis, 1997; Willis, 1999; Ribar, 2004) and stress the importance of family
resources (time and money) and endowments (caregivers’ ability) in the production of family public
goods such as child quality.
4Beneﬁts to Marriage
Financial resources are key determinants of child wellbeing (Blau, 1999), allowing parents to pur-
chase goods and services important for child development. Economic resources are complemented
by parenting resources—the services provided by the parents using their time and childrearing ability
(McLanahan and Sandefur, 1994). Interaction with the child fosters child development by providing
support, stimulation, and control (Maccoby and Martin, 1983). For healthy child development, both
time and material resources are needed (Coleman, 1988). Time and income are substitutable to a cer-
tain extent as money can buy childcare services and working in the labor market increases available
ﬁnancial resources.
By forming a union, the availability of family resources can increase through several mechanisms
(Becker, 1991; Michael, 1973; Shaw, 1987; Drewianka, 2004). First, individuals can realize gains from
specialization and exchange in the presence of comparative advantages: Households of married or
cohabiting parents may divide responsibilities across partners according to their individual capacities.8
Specialization of partners’ time is economically efﬁcient as it exploits comparative advantages of each
person in the production of goods that both enjoy (such as “child quality”). Second, individuals may
realize economies of scale in household production (e.g., sharing the apartment). Third, the two-parent
household can pool individuals’ resources and realize gains from exploiting risk-sharing opportunities.9
Fourth, individuals may become more productive as part of a family due to social learning. While
these beneﬁts apply to married couples and potentially to cohabitors as well, additional institutional
factors that enhance resource availability such as tax laws and insurance coverage, are often exclusive
to married couples.
Non-marital arrangements lack the rights and responsibilities granted by the legal bond of mar-
riage (Hamilton, 1999; Lundberg and Pollak, 1995). The marriage contract ensures that there is some
compensation for sacriﬁces made on behalf of the family, thereby encouraging specialization and more
deﬁned parental roles (Brown, 2004). Furthermore, marriage provides an environment that fosters the
allocation of resources towards children since responsibilities and agreements are more easily enforced
under family law and the cost of divorce reduces the risk of union dissolution.10 For example, in the
5absence of a marriage contract, the father’s incentive to invest in child quality may be low since he faces
greater uncertainty regarding the extent to which he will enjoy the beneﬁts of these investments in the
future.11 Moreover, given the greater difﬁculties for a non-resident father to monitor the effective use
of his monetary transfers to the mother on behalf of the child, the father may make suboptimal child
investments (Willis and Haaga, 1996; Willis, 1999).
Consistent with the resource hypotheses, Brown (2002) ﬁnds that the availability of economic re-
sourcesdiffermarkedlyacrossfamilyarrangements, withchildrenresidinginmother-onlyorcohabiting-
parents households being more likely to live in poverty, compared to children in married two-parent
families. McLanahan (1985) shows that differences in income explain up to half the differences in
child wellbeing. Hofferth (2001) estimates that among children under age 13, those living with single
mothersspent12to14fewerhourswiththeirparentsperweekcomparedtochildrenlivingwithmarried
parents.12 In addition, Waite and Gallagher (2000) ﬁnd some evidence that living together may induce
a stabilizing effect on the partners, which can increase resources as a result of greater productivity at
home and in the labor market.
While children in either married or cohabiting families may enjoy resources provided by two resi-
dent parents, there is evidence that cohabitors do not pool their incomes (Winkler, 1997; Bauman, 1999;
Kenney, 2004; Lerman, 2002; Oropesa et al., 2003). Bauman (1999) ﬁnds that income of a cohabiting
partner does less to amend the economic hardship than that of a spouse. Single-parent and cohabiting
families are found to spend smaller shares of their budget on child-related goods, such as education
(Ziol-Guest et al., 2004; DeLeire and Kalil, 2005). Parenting resources may also suffer in cohabiting
unions. Brown (2002) ﬁnds that cohabiting mothers are more likely to be psychologically distressed
than married mothers and suggests that this difference stems from the greater uncertainty regarding the
future of the union.
This paper focuses on the effect of marriage between the biological parents on child wellbeing. The
amount of resources allocated to the child may depend on whether or not the partner is biologically
related to the child. Hamilton’s kin selection model (1964), posits that genetic relatedness is a key
determinant of parental transfers. Biological parents may make greater investments in their children
6than non-biological parents for several reasons. First, biological parents may be more emotionally
attached to the child and feel more responsible for the child’s wellbeing. Second, the returns from child
investments may be higher for a biological parent. The father, for example, may be more involved if the
child is his own since the child can continue his family lineage and ascertain future intergenerational
transfers (Case et al., 2000). Third, the biological father may be required by law to pay child support
regardless of his relationship status with the mother.13;14
Selection into Marriage
Following the previous discussion, a transition towards marriage is expected to increase the avail-
ability of resources and paternal investments in children. However, unwed parents who later marry
may be substantially different from parents who remained unmarried. Most existing studies measure
the beneﬁts of marriage by comparing the wellbeing of out-of-wedlock children to children born within
marriage, and seldom accounts for the role of selection into marriage. In examining the effect of mar-
riage on child outcomes, potential differences in the characteristics and mate selection patterns between
parents who marry and those who remained unmarried, need to be addressed.
Economic theories of marriage posit that individuals optimally select a mate to exploit the beneﬁts
of marriage discussed in the previous section, subject to marriage market conditions and individual
endowments (Becker, 1973; Lam, 1988; Manser and Brown, 1980; McElroy and Horney, 1981; Pollak,
1995). As a result, union formation tends to be non-random. Lam (1988) shows that couples tend to be
positively assortatively matched to exploit marital gains through joint production of household public
goods and negatively assortatively matched in the presence of gains to specialization: Spouses are
typically found to be similar in age, race, education, and other socioeconomic characteristics (Epstein
and Guttman, 1984; Mare, 1991; Oppenheimer, 1988; Rockewell, 1976).
The characteristics and mate selection patterns of unwed parents who later marry have received
relatively little attention. Willis (1999) argues that theoretically, unmarried parents should have less
favorablecharacteristicsandbelessassortativelymatchedthanmarriedparents.15 Consistentwiththese
hypotheses, married parents are found to be of higher socioeconomic status than unwed parents (Weiss
and Willis, 1997; Sigle-Rushton and McLanahan, 2002a; Brown, 2004; Osborne and McLanahan,
72004; Osborne, 2005), and unmarried couples tend to be less (positively) assortatively matched (Jaffe
and Chacon-Puignau, 1995; Garﬁnkel et al., 2002). As in Brown and Booth (1996), these differences
in attributes and mating pattern likely contribute to the lower relationship quality and greater instability
found among cohabiting and visiting parents compared to married parents.
Given that selection into marriage is non-random complicates the estimation of the marriage effect.
Simple comparisons of child outcomes by marital status can be misleading if couples who get married
are substantially different from those who remain unmarried in ways that also affect child investments.
For example, if couples with characteristics that beneﬁt child development are also more likely to
get married, compared to those who remain unmarried, the beneﬁts of marriage may be overstated.
Conversely, if couples with poorer traits are more likely to get married after childbearing, a negative
association between marriage and child wellbeing may arise. For instance, the social stigma of non-
marital childbearing may induce some poorly-matched or -endowed couples to marry. In turn, the
development of their children may suffer as these parents may face greater difﬁculties in specializing
and coordinating the production of child quality. Given the limited understanding of the determinants of
marriage among out-of-wedlock parents, the direction and magnitude of the potential selection biases
in the estimates of the marriage effect remain unclear.
III. STATISTICAL MODEL AND ESTIMATION STRATEGY
In this section, we present a conceptual model of child investments and marriage for couples who
experienced a premarital birth. We then introduce the potential outcome approach and our estimation
strategy, namely the propensity score matching method.
Conceptual Model
Consider a couple i who have a child out-of-wedlock. The model of parental investments in their
child and the process of marriage formation following childbirth can be formalized as follows:
Ci = bMi+gXi+ei (1)
Mi = dXi+ni (2)
8whereCi denotes the observed child outcome of couple i; Mi is equals to (1) if the couple marries after
childbirth and (0) otherwise. The vector Xi includes characteristics of couple i that inﬂuence their child
investment and marital decisions. In this setting, child quality is determined by parental marital status,
observable characteristics Xi, and unmeasured factors ei. A couple’s decision of whether to marry
depends on their observed characteristics Xi and unobserved factors ni.
If marriage is exogenous to a couple’s child investment decisions, then ordinary least squares re-
gression of the effect of marriage on child outcomes yields an unbiased estimate of the effect of parents’
marriage after childbirth (b in (1)). However, a couple’s child investment behavior might be endoge-
nous to whether the couple transitions into marriage, i.e. if there is dependence between marital status
Mi and the error term ei. Correlation between Mi and ei can arise for one of two not necessarily mu-
tually exclusive reasons (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983; Heckman and Robb, 1985): (a) dependence
between Xi and ei (“selection on observables”); and (b) dependence between ei and ni (“selection on
unobservables”).
Our methodology addresses the selection on observables using propensity score matching (PSM).16
The FFCWS enables us to construct measures of the biological parents’ attributes and how assortatively
matched they are. The PSM method matches children based on these factors (and other characteristics),
thereby reducing potential bias induced by self-selection into marriage.17
Potential Outcome Approach
Using the terminology of the evaluation literature, consider the “treatment” to be the marriage
between the biological parents of child i after his/er birth: Mi = 1 denotes the “treatment group” (i.e.
children whose parents marry after childbirth), and Mi = 0 denotes the “control group” (i.e. children
whose parents remain unmarried). LetCi(1) denote the potential outcome of child i under the treatment
state (Mi = 1), andCi(0) the potential child outcome if the same child i receives no treatment (Mi = 0).
Thus,Ci = MiCi(1) + (1¡Mi)Ci(0) is the observed outcome of child i. The individual treatment effect
is bi = Ci(1) ¡ Ci(0), which is unobserved since either Ci(1) or Ci(0) is missing. Alternatively, one
might focus on the average effect of treatment on the treated (“effect of parents’ marriage on children
9whose parents marry after childbirth”), i.e. the ATET henceforth:
bMi=1 = E(bijMi = 1) = E[Ci(1)jMi = 1]¡E[Ci(0)jMi = 1] (3)
which is the difference between the expected outcome of a child whose parents marry, and the expected
outcome of the same child if his/er parents were to remain unmarried.
While we do observe the outcomes of children whose parents marry, and are thus able to construct
the ﬁrst expectation E[Ci(1)jMi =1], we cannot identify the counterfactual expectation E[Ci(0)jMi =1]
without invoking further assumptions. To overcome this problem, one has to rely on children whose
parents remain unmarried (Ci(0)), the comparison group, to obtain information on the counterfactual
outcome. Replacing E[Ci(0)jMi = 1] with E[Ci(0)jMi = 0] is inappropriate since the treated and un-
treated might differ in their characteristics determining the outcome. An ideal randomized experiment
would solve this problem because random assignment of couples into treatment ensures that potential
outcomes are independent of treatment status. In this hypothetical case, the treatment effect could be
consistently estimated by the difference between the means of the observed outcomes in the treatment
and the control groups. In our context where union formation is expected to be non-random we will
devise suitable matching estimators.
Matching
Statistical matching is a way to construct a correct sample counterpart for the counterfactual out-
comes of the treated had they not been treated. Since data on the counterfactual for the treated group is
unavailable, matching estimators can be devised to reconstruct the condition of an experiment by strat-
ifying the sample of treated and untreated children with respect to the covariates Xi that rule both the
selection into treatment and the outcome under study. Selection bias is eliminated provided all variables
in Xi are measured and balanced between the two groups. In this case, each stratum represents a sep-
arate randomized experiment and simple outcome differences between the treated and control groups
provide an unbiased estimate of the treatment effect.
Conditional Independence Assumption (CIA). An identifying assumption of the matching method is
10that the relevant outcome differences between any two children are captured in their observed character-
istics, called the “Conditional Independence Assumption”. It requires that, conditional on observables
Xi, the distribution of potential outcomes of children whose parents marry if they had remained unmar-
ried to be the same as the outcome distribution of children with persistently unmarried parents. Hence,
the outcomes of children whose parents remained unmarried are what the outcomes of children whose
parents married would have been if their parents had remained unmarried (conditional on Xi).18 More-
over, it assumes that there are untreated individuals for each x.19 It follows that E[Ci(0) j Xi;Mi = 1] =
E[Ci(0) j Xi;Mi = 0].The conditional response of the treated under no treatment for a given X can thus
be estimated by the conditional mean response of the untreated under no treatment.20
Average Treatment Effect for the Treated (ATET). Following the CIA, the average treatment effect on
the treated can be computed as follows:
bjMi=1 = E[Ci(1) j Mi = 1]¡E[Ci(0) j Mi = 1] (4)
= EX[E[Ci(1) j Xi;Mi = 1]¡E[Ci(0) j Xi;Mi = 1] j Mi = 1]
= EX[E[Ci(1) j Xi;Mi = 1]¡E[Ci(0) j Xi;Mi = 0] j Mi = 1]
= EX[E[Ci j Xi;Mi = 1]¡E[Ci j Xi;Mi = 0] j Mi = 1]
To estimate the average treatment effect on the treated, one is to ﬁrst take the outcome difference be-
tween the two treatment groups conditional on Xi, then average over the distribution of the observables
in the treated population.21
Conditioning on X within a ﬁnite sample can be problematic if the vector of observables is of high
dimension. The number of matching cells increases exponentially as the number of covariates in X
increases. Rubin (1979) and Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) suggest the use of the propensity score, i.e.
the conditional probability of participating in the treatment p(Xi) = Pr(Mi = 1 j Xi = x) = E(Mi j Xi),
to stratify the sample. They showed that by deﬁnition the treated and the non-treated with the sample
propensity score have the same distribution of X: Xi ? Mi j p(Xi).22 Furthermore, if Ci(0) ? Mi j Xi,
then Ci(0) ? Mi j p(Xi). This implies that matching can be performed on p(Xi) alone, which is more
11parsimonious than the full set of interactions needed to match treated and untreated based on X, thus
reducing the dimensionality problem into a single variable p(Xi).
Matchingtreatedanduntreatedcoupleswiththesamplepropensityscoresandplacingthemintoone
cell (i.e., observations with propensity scores falling within a speciﬁc range) means that the decision of
whether to participate or not is random within each cell and the probability of participation in this cell
equals the propensity score. Consequently, the difference between the treated and the untreated average
outcomes at any value of p(Xi) is an unbiased estimate of the average treatment effect for the treated
at that value of p(Xi). Therefore, an unbiased estimate of the ATET can be obtained conditioning on
p(Xi), which is equal to exact matching on p(Xi): bjMi=1 = Ep(X)[(E(Ci j Mi = 1;p(Xi))¡E(Ci j Mi =
0;p(Xi))) j Mi = 1].
The implementation of this framework has several challenges. First, the propensity score itself
needs to be estimated. Second, since it is a continuous variable, the probability of ﬁnding an exact
match is theoretically zero. Therefore, a certain distance between the treated and untreated has to be
accepted. Several matching procedures have been proposed to solve this problem (Becker and Ichino,
2002). To estimate the ATET, this study employs Kernel estimators.23;24 We refer to the Technical
Appendix for a discussion of these estimators. There are tradeoffs between the quantity and quality of
the matches among these estimators but none is a priori superior. However, their joint consideration
offers a way to assess the robustness of our results.
IV. DATA and DESCRIPTIVE EVIDENCE
Our study sample consists of 958 children born to parents who were unmarried but romantically
involved at childbirth drawn from the Fragile Families and Child Wellbeing Study (FFCWS). The
FFCWS collected data on a cohort of 4;898 births in 75 hospitals in 16 large cities (with population of
200;000 or more) across the U.S. between 1998 to 2000. The weighted sample is representative of all
births in large U.S. cities in 1999.25 The FFCWS is unique as it provides information on a large set of
children born to unmarried parents in various living arrangements and relationship structures. Within
the original cohort, 3;600 were born to unmarried parents. Both biological parents were interviewed at
thetimeofchildbirth, whenthechildreachesageone, andthenatagethree. Areassuchasparent-parent
12and parent-child relationships, socioeconomic activities, and child development are covered.
At the three-year follow-up, the FFCWS collects data from a random subsample of the core re-
spondents (n = 2;368) on various domains of the child’s environment, called the “36-Month In-Home
Longitudinal Study of Pre-School Aged Children”. As part of the In-Home survey, the Peabody Pic-
ture Vocabulary Test (PPVT) is administered to the child by the interviewer. The PPVT is a well-
documented and widely-used measure of verbal ability and early scholastic aptitude, and has been
shown to be predictive of subsequent intellectual ability and achievement (Dunn and Dunn, 1981).26
Our study sample is selected as follows. First, given that the child outcome measures are available
only through the 36-Month In-Home survey, children not part of the random subsample selected for
the survey (2;530 cases) are excluded. Second, we focus on children born to unmarried biological par-
ents who were at least romantically involved at childbirth (i.e., either in cohabiting or visiting unions),
therefore children born to parents who were either married (508 cases) or not romantically involved
(221 cases) upon childbirth are excluded (N = 1;639 remains).27 Third, to keep track of the history of
parental relationship transitions, parental relationship status must be identiﬁed in all three waves: Bio-
logical parents whose relationship status cannot be identiﬁed at baseline (349 cases), one-year follow-
up (141 cases), or the three-year follow-up (69 cases) are dropped. Fourth, we cross check the marriage
date (available since the one-year follow-up) with parents’ reported marital status at childbirth. Ob-
servations in which the reported marriage date contradicts the reported marital status of the parents at
childbirth are dropped (6 cases). An additional 23 cases are dropped due to missing information on im-
portant socioeconomic and demographic characteristics.28 In the resulting sample, consisting of 1;051
children all born to unmarried parents, 19% experienced the marriage of their biological parents by age
three [weighted = 24%].
Finally, we estimate the propensity score of selection into treatment (i.e., the probability of parents’
marrying within three years since childbirth) within this sample of 1;051 children. To ensure sufﬁcient
overlapofthepropensityscoresbetweenthe treatmentandcontrolgroups, observationswithpropensity
scores falling outside of the common support region are excluded from the analysis (six treated and 87
controls), resulting in the ﬁnal sample size of 958 children.
13Sample Descriptives
Table 1 presents summary statistics of the measures used in this study. Sample descriptives are
ﬁrst presented for the entire sample (Columns 2 and 3). Columns 4 and 5 present variable means
for children whose parents marry within three years after childbirth, and children whose parents re-
mained unmarried, respectively. About 64% of the children were born to cohabiting parents, while the
remaining were born to visiting parents. Among children with parents who transition into marriage
within three years after childbirth (20% of the sample), 81% (19%) had cohabiting (visiting) parents
at birth.29 Among biological parents who remained unmarried after three years since childbirth, 53%
remain romantically involved with each other in either cohabiting or visiting relationships at wave 3.
For parents who are no longer romantically involved at wave 3, 38% of the mothers and 27% of the
fathers have entered into romantic relationships with new partners (results not shown).
Child cognitive ability is measured by the child’s standardized PPVT test score administered at age
three.30 The mean PPVT score in our sample is 84:9 (S.D. = 16). Children whose parents marry within
three years since childbirth display signiﬁcantly higher cognitive ability at age three, with an average
PPVT score of 87:4, compared to 84:3 among children whose parents remained unmarried.
Who Gets Married?
Parents who marry after childbirth are better off in many dimensions compared to parents who re-
mained unmarried (henceforth “persistently unmarried”)31: They are older, more educated, more likely
to participate in the labor market, have higher earnings and household income. White and Hispanic
mothers are more likely to marry their children’s fathers, compared to black mothers.
Table 2 summarizes the differences in (positive) assortative mating patterns between unmarried
parents who marry after childbirth, and persistently unmarried parents. We examine disparities between
the partners’ traits, such as age, education, race/ethnicity, and labor income. Overall, the age difference
between the partners is larger for parents who marry than among persistently unmarried parents. There
is also greater variation in the partners’ age difference among parents who marry. The prevalence of
unions in which the mother is older than her partner are similar across the two groups (about 20%).
Mixed-race unions are more common among those who marry.32
14Married mothers tend to be more educated than their partners:33 About 29% of the mothers who
marry the child’s father after childbirth is more educated than the father (compared to 27% of persis-
tently unmarried parents). The prevalence of less assortment by labor earnings is similar among parents
who marry after childbirth and those who remained persistently unmarried.34 However, its distribution
varies markedly across the two subsamples: Among mothers who earn more than their partners, those
who marry tend to have lower labor income compared to mothers who are persistently unmarried. This
implies that among children whose parents are less assorted by earnings (i.e., unions in which the
mother has higher earnings than the father), those whose parents subsequently marry may face greater
economic disadvantages, compared to their counterparts whose parents remained unmarried.
Finally, we examine the differences in relationship characteristics between parents who marry after
childbirth and persistently unmarried parents. Parents who marry are more likely to have rushed into
marriage, given that they tend to have known each other for less than six months prior to pregnancy,
compared to persistently unmarried parents (15% vs. 11%). Consistent with Carlson et al. (2004),
we also ﬁnd that mothers who marry their child’s father after childbirth are also more likely to be
catholic and attend religious activities frequently. The incidence of the father suggesting abortion
during pregnancy is lower among children whose parents marry compared to those with persistently
unmarried parents. The father suggesting abortion during pregnancy may be a signal of whether the
pregnancy was planned, but also be correlated with the father’s attitudes towards abortion and marriage.
For fathers who are against abortion, an unintended pregnancy may provide a strong incentive to marry,
even if the quality of the match between him and the mother is poor and/or uncertain.
V. Estimation Results
In a standard parametric framework (i.e., OLS), the average cognitive outcomes of children whose
parents marry (treatment group) are compared to the average outcomes of children whose parents re-
mained unmarried (control group). The linearity assumption permits data on all observations to be
combined into one estimate, but the validity of the estimate is suspect when the average outcome is
taken over observations with very different characteristics (Levine and Painter, 2003). Thus, the re-
sults tend to be sensitive to the choice of functional form. In addition, the estimation procedures create
15estimates that are complex averages of the typical treatment effect on the treated and the controls.35
Propensity score matching (PSM) methods relax the linearity assumption. By matching each treated
observation with controls who are share similar observable characteristics, the differences in their out-
comes are taken as driven by their treatment status only. In this setting, the estimated marriage effect is
the average of the typical effect of treatment on the treated only, rather than the average of the treatment
effects on the treated and the controls.
Estimation results using conventional OLS regressions and propensity score matching are presented
in this section. Note that if the linearity assumption holds, then OLS and matching should produce very
similar results. However, if the effect of marriage on children whose parents marry differ substantially
from the average effect of marriage on children of persistently unmarried parents, then PSM yields the
unbiased estimate of the causal effect of marriage on child outcomes.
If the characteristics of parents who marry differ substantially from parents who remained unmar-
ried, then we would expect the parametric (OLS) and semi-nonparametric (PSM) estimates to differ.
Following the discussion in Section 2.2, if better-off parents are more likely to marry, OLS would over-
state the effect of marriage. Conversely, if disadvantaged parents are more likely to marry, then the
OLS results would understate the marriage effect, suggesting that the beneﬁts of marriage are larger
among children whose parents marry than the average out-of-wedlock child.
Ordinary Least Squares Estimates
Table 3 presents the OLS estimates of the effect of parents’ marriage after childbirth on children’s
PPVT score at age three. The results using six model speciﬁcations are presented. The “Baseline
Model” shows the gross difference in the PPVT test scores between children whose parents marry,
and children of persistently unmarried parents. On average, children whose parents marry score 3:073
points higher on the PPVT (1=5th of a standard deviation) compared to children whose parents re-
mained unmarried. As shown in Model 1, the marriage effect is robust to a set of basic controls includ-
ing relationship status at birth, child gender, low birth weight, and state of residence at childbirth.
As mentioned earlier, information on men who father children outside of marriage are largely un-
available in existing large datasets. As a result, studies examining the effect of family structure on
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ﬂuences. By doing so, these studies implicitly assume that the traits between the unwed partners are
highly correlated, similar to that of married couples. This assumption may be inappropriate if unmar-
ried parents differ substantially in their choices of mates compared to married couples. To illustrate the
importance of accounting for both parents’ characteristics and their patterns of assortative mating in
analyzing the effect of family structure on child wellbeing, Model 3, 4, and 5 each additionally con-
trolling for mother’s characteristics, father’s characteristics, and more detailed parental characteristics
including similarities in traits (mating patterns) and proxies for relationship quality.
Holding basic family and child characteristics, and household income constant, Model 3 addition-
ally controls for mother’s characteristics. Differences in mothers’ characteristics account for 12% of the
differences in the cognitive outcomes at age three between children whose parents marry and children
whose parents remained unmarried. If parents match assortatively (i.e., the partners’ traits are highly
correlated), additionally controlling for father’s characteristics should have little effect on the estimated
marriage effect. Model 4 shows that adding controls for the biological father’s attributes appears to
weaken the marriage effect. Holding both parents’ characteristics constant, children whose parents
marry after childbirth have PPVT scores of 2:38 points higher (1=7th of a standard deviation) than their
counterparts whose parents remained unmarried. Adding more detail on the couple—including mating
patterns and other potential proxies for relationship quality—tends to further improve the ﬁt and reduce
the marriage effect (see Model 5).
Matching Estimates
Propensity score matching is a way to obtain estimates of the causal (unbiased) effect of marriage
on child outcomes. The bias is reduced when the comparison of outcomes is performed using treated
and control units with similar observable characteristics. To understand the potential bias introduced
through self-selection into marriage, the differences in the characteristics between the treated and the
control groups need to be highlighted. The descriptive evidence and OLS estimates highlight the im-
portance of both parents’ traits and their relationship-speciﬁc characteristics (such as assortative mating
patterns) in explaining the differences in child outcomes. To that end, we match the treated and control
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each parent’s socioeconomic and demographic characteristics. Therefore, we ﬁrst illustrate the factors
affecting a couple’s propensity to marry, namely the propensity score estimates. Then, the matching
estimates are presented.
Estimating the Propensity Score of Marriage. The ﬁrst step in implementing the matching method is to
estimate the propensity score for the treatment (“marriage”) under study. Parents’ propensity to marry
is deﬁned as a function of each parents’ socioeconomic and demographic characteristics, child-speciﬁc
characteristics observed at childbirth, and measures of union match quality.36 We account for parental
relationship status at childbirth when estimating the propensity score, since the majority of the parents
who transition into marriage were cohabitors at the time of childbirth (81%), while the remaining were
in visiting relationships.
Table 4 presents probit estimates of the propensity score of selection into treatment, i.e. the prob-
ability of transitioning into marriage among unmarried biological parents with a newborn.37 Com-
pared to persistently unmarried parents (holding everything else constant), unwed mothers who marry
their children’s fathers after childbirth (i) are (positively) assortatively matched in terms of their age,
race/ethnic backgrounds, and labor incomes, but less (positively) assortatively matched by their edu-
cational backgrounds: Unions in which the male is less-educated than the female are more likely to
transition into marriage;38 (ii) are signiﬁcantly more likely to have known their children’s fathers for
less than six months prior to pregnancy; and (iii) attend religious activities frequently (at least a few
times a week).
Weiss and Willis (1997) ﬁnd that the lack of (positive) assortative mating, in particular with respect
to education, contributes to martial instability. Given our ﬁnding that parents who marry after child-
birth are less positively assortatively matched by education may suggest higher relationship instability
among these unions. In addition, couples who marry appear to have been together for less time prior
to pregnancy, which may suggest that they transitioned into marriage faster then planned (perhaps suc-
cumbing to social/religious pressures in the presence of an unplanned pregnancy), while having only
limited information about their partners and the potential quality of their match upon marriage.
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riage after childbirth on child PPVT score at age three.39 The effect of marriage on children whose
parents marry (“average treatment effect on the treated”) based on the Epanechnikov, Gaussian, and
uniform kernel (radius) estimators are reported, respectively. To assess the sensitivity of the estimates
to the choice of bandwidth (or radius), we report results using different bandwidths (or radiuses). These
and additional results from robustness checks are discussed in detail in the Technical Appendix (Sec-
tions 2 and 3).
The matching estimates conﬁrm the direction of the marriage effect suggested by the parametric
results reported in Model 5 of Table 3: Parents’ marriage after childbirth has a signiﬁcant positive
effect on child cognitive ability at age three. Speciﬁcally, the matching estimates show that children
whose parents marry after childbirth, on average, score 3:5 to 4:4 points (¼ between 1=5th to 1=4th of
a standard deviation) higher on the PPVT than to children whose parents remained unmarried. Simple
correlations that we obtained from the Young Adults from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth
(Cohort 1979) suggest that a four point increase in the PPVT score at age three may raise the odds of
graduating from high school by as much as two percentage points.
We note that the matching estimates, which are based on comparing outcomes of children who
experienced marriage to similar children whose parents remained unmarried, tend to be larger in mag-
nitude than the parametric estimates.40 This indicates that the effect of marriage on out-of-wedlock
children’s cognitive development is heterogeneous. The latter is consistent with parents who choose
to marry after having an out-of-wedlock birth being selectively different from persistently unmarried
parents. As discussed above, we observe that the couples that transition into marriage tend to be dif-
ferent from those that remain unmarried. In particular, the model comparison suggests that children of
parents who are less well acquainted and less well assortatively matched—and who thus are potentially
less able to provide a stable family environment in the absence of the legal bond of marriage—may
enjoy greater beneﬁts to marriage.
In general marriage may be beneﬁcial for children for a number of reasons as discussed above (see
Section 2). Beneﬁts to marriage may reﬂect gains in resources, economies of scale or specialization in
19householdactivities. Itisunlikelythatthematchingestimatesreﬂectgainsofmarriagethroughresource
pooling and/or specialization, since married parents are matched with unmarried parents who share
similar household incomes and multiple dimensions of partners’ differentials in traits. The differences
in child outcomes may reﬂect the extentthat married and cohabiting parents enjoy economies of scale in
joint production, which are more limited for visiting parents. Consistent with the idea that economies of
scale partly explain the beneﬁts of marriage, subsample analysis of children born to cohabiting parents
only (N = 640) shows smaller marriage effects (results available upon request).
In addition, potential differences in the quantity and/or quality of investments made in children
between married and unmarried families may also contribute to the estimated differences in child out-
comes. It has been found that compared to families with married parents, (holding family income
constant), cohabiting and single-parent families devote smaller shares of the family budget to their
children (Ziol-Guest et al., 2004; DeLeire and Kalil, 2005), spent less time with their children (Carl-
son and McLanahan, 2001; Hofferth and Anderson, 2003), and face greater difﬁculties in monitoring
and disciplining children (Bulcroft et al., 1998; Brown, 2002). Finally, while unmarried parenthood
is less stigmatized today, it still does not beneﬁt fully from legal and social recognition (Durst, 1997;
Mahoney, 2002). Hence, in the absence of a legal arrangement (“marriage”), lower incentives to al-
locate resources towards the child combined with greater difﬁculties in coordinating and monitoring
investments, may translate into suboptimal child investments being made.
VI. CONCLUSION
The dramatic rise in out-of-wedlock childbearing and concerns over the potential adverse effects
of non-traditional arrangements between the parents on child wellbeing have prompted policies aimed
at encouraging marriage among unwed parents. The belief that the welfare of out-of-wedlock children
is better protected if their parents get married is founded (at least in part) on evidence showing that
children of unwed parents tend to exhibit inferior outcomes, compared to children born to married
parents. However, couples who have children before vs. after marriage are selectively different, hence
the differences in child outcomes across the two types of families do not directly speak of the potential
beneﬁts of marriage for children who are born out-of-wedlock.
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volved, using a representative sample of children all born to unwed parents. Adopting the treatment
outcome framework to account for parental self-selection into marriage, we ﬁnd evidence of a causal
effect of parents’ marriage on the cognitive development of children whose parents marry within three
years after childbirth. Compared to children of unmarried parents who share similar background char-
acteristics and mate-selection patterns, children whose parents marry score about four points higher on
the Peabody Picture Vocabulary Test at age three, which may translate into up to two percentage points
greater odds of the child eventually receiving a high school degree.
While our ﬁndings support the idea that marriage after childbearing beneﬁts the children involved,
the results also suggests that such beneﬁts do not necessarily apply for all children born out-of-wedlock.
We ﬁnd that parents who marry after having children are selectively different from persistently unmar-
ried parents, and, in particular, that those couple who can realize the largest beneﬁts from marriage for
their child are also more likely to get married. While it is well documented that couples who marry
before having children are more socioeconomically advantaged and assortatively matched compared
to unwed parents, we ﬁnd evidence that among unwed couples with children, those who are relatively
less well acquainted and potentially more poorly matched are more likely to transition into marriage
within three years after the child’s birth. Their children may face larger gains from marriage through
economies of scale in joint production, and the legal bond of marriage may generate additional incen-
tives to allocate a greater share of the available resources towards their children.
Our ﬁnding that the beneﬁts to marriage for the child are greater among families where the parents
are more likely to get married is consistent with economic theories of out-of-wedlock childbearing by
Willis (1999) and gains to marriage as in Becker (1973; 1974) and Weiss and Willis (1997). Unmarried
parents tend to be less well matched than parents who have children within marriage since the incentive
for assortative mating is lower in the absence of specialization. Conditional on having a child, unmar-
ried couples who see higher gains to marriage (relative to the alternative of staying unmarried) will
be more likely to get married, while couples who see little gains to getting married remain single.41
Hence, programs to promote marriage provide incentives that are likely in addition to private incentives
21that are aligned with this objective and marital behavior consistent with the child’s interest.
Whilefurtherresearchintothemechanismsthroughwhichparents’marriagebeneﬁtsout-of-wedlock
children is needed, our ﬁndings provide some evidence that even after ruling out potential gains through
resource pooling and specialization, children beneﬁt from having married parents as they can exploit
economies of scale through joint production. In addition, marriage may induce parents to allocate a
greater fraction of family resources towards their children. However, because we do not directly ob-
serve potential differences in the intra-household production and allocation of inputs for children across
married and unmarried families, we cannot distinguish whether the marital gains found is attributable
to either one (or both) of these two channels. If the gains are due to economies of scale, encouraging
unwed parents to establish a joint household, which improves input-production efﬁciencies, should be
endorsed. If the lack of legal protection lessens the incentives to invest in children (perhaps due to
the lack of guarantees that their resources will be used optimally, or that they will be able to enjoy
the returns of their investments), extending legal protection and responsibility to unmarried biological
parents (in particular fathers) may aid the allocation of resources towards out-of-wedlock children.
Although we ﬁnd that out-of wedlock children beneﬁt from the marriage of their parents, the par-
ents are also found to be less well assortatively matched, which has been associated with relationship
instability and higher risk of dissolution. Given that parental separation/divorce have been found to
negatively affect child outcomes, the adverse effects of parental relationship dissolution in the long run
may eventually outweigh the positive effect of marriage in the short run. Because the time span covered
by FFCWS is relatively short and these children are young, we cannot readily explore to what extent
marital dissolution would offset the observed marital beneﬁts. Given our focus on children born out-
of-wedlock, the ﬁndings presented here do not readily speak to whether the large differences in child
outcomes typically found between children born to married vs. unmarried parents should be interpreted
as causal effects of marriage. We note that, although the FFCWS includes children born to married par-
ents, an application of the potential outcome approach to assess the effect of marriage between children
born to married vs. unmarried parents is infeasible since information on these parents before childbirth
is very limited.
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1. See Ribar (2004) for a sweeping review of this literature.
2. E.g., President Bush’s Personal Responsibility and Welfare Reauthorization Act allocates a sig-
niﬁcant budget to programs promoting and stabilizing marriage. See Garﬁnkel et al. (2003) for a
discussion.
3. Two recent studies use FFCWS to examine the determinants of marriage among unmarried parents.
Carlson et al. (2004) examines the determinants of marriage between unwed parents within one year
after childbirth; and Osborne (2005) explores differences in the determinants of marriage between
cohabiting and single parents. However, neither study explores assortative mating patterns among
these parents.
4. Finding a representative sample of nonresident fathers has proved extraordinarily difﬁcult. In U.S.
nationally representative surveys (e.g., CPS, NSFH, and SIPP), it has been estimated that more than
one ﬁfth and perhaps as many as one-half of nonresident fathers are “missing,” i.e., not identiﬁed
as fathers (Cherlin et al., 1983; Garﬁnkel et al., 1998; Sorenson, 1997). The problem is especially
pronounced men who fathered children outside of marriage, more than half appear to be missing.
Although longitudinal studies of divorced fathers offer a more complete picture, even these suffer from
non-inclusion and non-response bias (Garﬁnkel et al., 1998).
5. This assumption is frequently made in estimating the potential economic contributions of non-
resident fathers for their children (E.g., Garﬁnkel et al., 1998; Garﬁnkel and Oellerich, 1989; Miller et
al., 1997; Sorenson, 1997; Paull et al., 2000).
6. Two recent studies examine the effects of parental relationship structure on early child outcomes
using the FFCWS. Heiland and Liu (2006) examines how different types of parental relationship transi-
tions affect child health and behavioral outcomes at age one; and Osborne et al. (2003) compares child
behavioral outcomes at age three between persistently-married, cohabit then subsequently married, and
persistently cohabiting parents. Neither study explicitly accounts for selection into marriage.
7. “Visiting” relationships refers to couples who are romantically involved but living separately.
8. The beneﬁts of specialization may be greater for married couples than for cohabiting couples, since
30specialization is riskier for women without a legal commitment.
9. Following Becker (1991), the pooling of all resources arises if the dominant decision-maker is
altruistic or if the partners have the same objectives. However, if these assumptions are relaxed (e.g.,
McElroy, 1990; Manser and Brown, 1980; McElroy and Horney, 1981), one person’s resources cannot
be treated as common household income.
10. The extent to which available resources are allocated towards speciﬁc public goods depends on
preferences and individual bargaining power. The latter reﬂects the opportunities a partner has outside
the union (McElroy, 1990; Manser and Brown, 1980; McElroy and Horney, 1981).
11. The same applies for children in father-only households. Note that while the number of households
with custodial fathers is on the rise (Meyer and Garasky, 1993), they remain the exception.
12. Single parents may be unable to perform the multiple roles and tasks required for childrearing,
which can result in heightened stress levels and insufﬁcient monitoring, demands, and warmth in their
childrearing practices (Cherlin, 1992; Thomson et al., 1994; Wu, 1996). Brown (2004) suggests that
conﬂicts over visitation may also encumber parenting effectiveness.
13. The Family Support Act of 1988 requires states to establish legal paternity for all births, apply
child support formulas based on a father’s resources, establish stronger collection procedures.
14. If a child is born out-of-wedlock and the father disputes paternity, the court determines paternity
via DNA testing.
15. Becker (1973, 1974, 1991) showed that when (i) there are as many men as women, and/or (ii)
women are in excess supply and lack the economic resources to bear children out-of-wedlock, an
equilibrium assignment of matches between men and women occurs as all couples assortatively match
to maximize the total gains across all possible matches, and all children will be born within marriage.
Willis (1999) showed that when women are in excess supply and are economically self-reliant, another
equilibriuminthemarriagemarketexists: Womenfromthelowereconomicstrata—thosewithincomes
(traits) sufﬁcient for childrearing but not to attract a high-income male to enter into marriage—would
bear children out-of-wedlock. Some unmarried men can father these children at a low cost, as they are
not expected to play an important role in childrearing.
16. The Instrumental Variables (IV) strategy provides an alternative to account for selection into mar-
riage. However, ﬁnding a suitable instrument for marriage is difﬁcult. State and local marriage restric-
tions have been used as instruments for marriage but are problematic for several reasons: (1) state and
local marriage restrictions may not detect any effects on marriage if few people are close to the margin
where these restrictions matter; (2) even if these policies have measurable effects on marriage, Ribar
(2004) points out that they might only be enacted in areas with particular socioeconomic characteristics
or as a result of concerns about local marriage and wellbeing trends; and (3) Card (1999) and Heckman
et al. (1999) point out that instruments can also fail when there are differences across people in the
effects of an event, like marriage, which subsequently affect people’s decision-making. Consider the
case in which there is exogenous variation in marriage restrictions across areas. In areas with burden-
some restrictions, only people who foresee large gains to marriage will marry, while in areas with few
31restrictions, even people who foresee smaller gains will marry. In this case, the size of the marriage
effect varies systematically with the otherwise exogenous costs of marriage.
17. The unusually rich data on the determinants of marriage available in the FFCWS may also help
to limit the extent of selection on unobservables. Potential bias from selection on unobservables is
reduced to the extent that the Xi are proxying for unmeasured factors.
18. This rules out possible unobservables affecting both Ci(0) and Mi. Our analysis utilizes the de-
tailed individual and couple relationship characteristics available in the FFCWS to specify the marriage
matching functions.
19. More speciﬁcally: Pr(Mi =0jXi =x) > 0 for all x. This implies that individuals are matched only
over the common support region of Xi where the treated and untreated group overlap.
20. This is simply to replace the unobserved outcomes of the treated had they not been treated with the
outcomes of the untreated with the same Xi characteristics.
21. The regression equivalent of this procedure requires the inclusion of all the possible interactions
between the observables Xi. Regression and matching approaches differ in the weighting schemes used
to average estimates at different values.
22. This is the so-called balancing property of the propensity score.
23. Various methods exist to implement matching estimates, all based on the same strategy of pairing
individuals but with different techniques for pairing or different weights given to counterfactual individ-
uals. This study implements three derivatives of kernel matching: Uniform (i.e. radius), Epanechnikov
and Gaussian kernels.
24. Matching can be done with or without replacement of the control units. Matching with replacement
reduces bias but increase the variance. Here we use matching with replacement.
25. See Reichman et al. (2001) for a detailed descriptive of the study design and sampling methods.
26. Since the PPVT is based on receptive hearing of standard American English vocabulary, its cultural
fairness has been debated. For example, see Washington and Craig (1999). Our analysis allows for
racial and ethnic differences in verbal ability using information on both parents’ race and ethnicity.
27. The reasons for non-involvement may be plentiful (e.g., separation, surrogacy, etc.), and cannot be
identiﬁed in the data. The process of marriage and child investments among non-involved parents likely
differs in fundamental ways from romantically involved parents, warranting an approach that models
these processes separately, a task beyond the scope of this paper.
28. To ensure that exclusions of these observations do not result in a selected sample (i.e., if the ten-
dency of under-reporting is correlated with the treatment), we construct missing indicators for each of
these covariates and conduct t-tests of means for each of the missing indicators between the treated and
control groups. None of the t-tests show signiﬁcant differences in the prevalence of under-reporting
across the two groups (results are available upon request).
3229. This is consistent with Osborne (2005) who ﬁnds that cohabiting mothers are more likely to marry
within one year after childbirth than mothers who were in visiting relationships at childbirth.
30. The PPVT scores are normalized against a national population with a mean of 100 and a variance
of 15 points.
31. This is consistent with earlier ﬁndings by Carlson et al. (2004) using the FFCWS: Unwed parents
of higher socioeconomic status are more likely to marry within one year after childbirth.
32. This is consistent with Osborne (2005), who ﬁnds that FFCWS parents who are of different racial
backgrounds are more likely to marry within one year after childbirth.
33. The FFCWS provides information on the highest level of education attained. “More educated”
refers to strictly higher level of educational attainment.
34. The statistics on labor earnings exclude unions in which at least one partner does not work.
35. This means that the average treatment effect on the treated (ATET) is assumed to be equivalent to
the average treatment effect on the controls (ATEC).
36. The covariates Xi used in estimating the propensity score are identical to the fully-speciﬁed model
(Model 5) in Table 3.
37. Estimating the propensity score using a logit model produces very similar results.
38. Graefe and Lichter (1999) use data from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (1979 Cohort)
to examine women’s propensity to marry after experiencing a premarital birth. They ﬁnd a positive
relationship between a woman’s education and her likelihood of subsequently entering into marriage.
However, their study does not examine potential disparities between the partners’ education levels.
39. Following the algorithm proposed by Dehejia and Wahba (1999), observations are grouped into
blocks deﬁned based on the estimated propensity score and then the balancing property is tested within
each block to ensure that the observables are sufﬁciently similar between the treated and controls within
each block. Once the balance is achieved, the distributions of covariates X among the treated and
control groups should be identical within each block. (For details of the test of the balancing property
within each block, see Appendix Table 1). Figure 1 shows the box plot of the estimated propensity
score within each block. The ﬁgure reveals that there is good overlap in terms of the propensity score
within each block, while in the extreme bins there is only limited overlap. This can be expected since
the number of treated units increases and the number of control units decreases at high values of the
propensity score. Note that this does not generate bias in the estimates as long as the balancing property
is satisﬁed.
40. Three of the ﬁve matching estimates are statistically different from the OLS at the 5% signiﬁcance
level or better.
41. For example, conditional on already having a child with a poorly matched partner, a mother may
realize higher gains to getting married to the child’s father (relative to staying unmarried) if (1) her
33bargaining power within the relationship may be enhanced and more resources will be allocated to-
wards her children within marriage, which may not be available/enforceable in the absence of a marital
agreement, and (2) her outside option of attracting a better match as a single mother is low.
34Abbreviations:
ATEC: Average Treatment Effect on the Controls
ATET: Average Treatment Effect on the Treated
CIA: Conditional Independence Assumption
CPS: Current Population Survey
DNA: Deoxyribonucleic Acid
FFCWS: Fragile Families and Child Wellbeing Study
IV: Instrumental Variables
NLSY: National Longitudinal Survey of Youth
NSFH: National Survey of Families and Households
OLS: Ordinary Least Squares
PPVT: Peabody Picture Vocabulary Test
PSM: Propensity Score Matching
SIPP: Survey of Income and Program ParticipationTABLE 1
Sample Descriptives
Parents’ Marital Status




Child PPVT Score (Age 3) 84:91 [15:74] 87:37 84:30¤
Parents’ Relationship at Childbirth
Cohabiting 0:637 [0:481] 0:813 0:597¤
Visiting 0:363 [0:481] 0:187 0:403¤
Child Characteristics
Child is of low birth weight (< 88 oz) 0:099 [0:298] 0:081 0:103
Child is female 0:469 [0:499] 0:490 0:464
Child’s birth order (mother):
- 1st 0:342 [0:474] 0:323 0:345
- 2nd 0:329 [0:470] 0:333 0:328
- 3rd or higher 0:304 [0:460] 0:328 0:299
Parent’s Demographic Characteristics
Mother’s age < 20 at childbirth 0:242 [0:428] 0:177 0:257¤
Father’s age < 20 at childbirth 0:119 [0:324] 0:063 0:132¤
Mother’s race/ethnicity:
- white 0:156 [0:363] 0:214 0:143¤
- black 0:575 [0:495] 0:367 0:623¤
- Hispanic 0:243 [0:429] 0:388 0:210¤
- other 0:025 [0:156] 0:031 0:023
Father’s race/ethnicity:
- white 0:115 [0:319] 0:192 0:097¤
- black 0:615 [0:487] 0:414 0:661¤
- Hispanic 0:238 [0:426] 0:369 0:208¤
- other 0:032 [0:177] 0:025 0:034
Mother is foreign-born 0:058 [0:234] 0:116 0:045¤
Father is foreign-born 0:179 [0:383] 0:192 0:176
Child’s Household Income
Income less than $10;000 0:219 [0:414] 0:137 0:239¤
Income between $10;000 and $24;999 0:348 [0:477] 0:355 0:347
Income at least $25;000 0:433 [0:496] 0:508 0:415¤









- high school diploma / GED 0:370 [0:483] 0:318 0:382+
- some college 0:245 [0:430] 0:303 0:231¤
- bachelor & beyond 0:027 [0:161] 0:045 0:022
Father’s education:
- high school diploma / GED 0:385 [0:487] 0:333 0:397+
- some college 0:224 [0:417] 0:242 0:219
- bachelor & beyond 0:024 [0:152] 0:076 0:012¤
Parents’ Labor Market Activities
Mother works 0:188 [0:391] 0:222 0:181
Mother’s weekly hours of work 35:11 [9:065] 36:36 34:75
Mother’s annual labor income:
- less than $10;000 0:407 [0:493] 0:303 0:433
- between $10;000 and $24;999 0:467 [0:500] 0:545 0:448
- at least $25;000 0:126 [0:333] 0:152 0:119
Father works 0:824 [0:381] 0:909 0:804¤
Father’s weekly hours of work 43:74 [11:29] 44:53 43:52
Father’s annual labor income:
- less than $10;000 0:295 [0:457] 0:242 0:311+
- between $10;000 and $24;999 0:463 [0:499] 0:466 0:462
- at least $25;000 0:242 [0:429] 0:292 0:227
N 958 192 766
Notes: ¤ Sample means between “children whose parents marry after childbirth” and “children whose









































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Effect of Parents’ Marriage after Childbirth on Child PPVT Score at Age 3 (OLS)
Baseline Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Parents married (by age 3) 3.073¤ 3.085¤ 2.961¤ 2.603¤ 2.375¤ 2.158+
[1:277] [1:263] [1:250] [1:176] [1:205] [1:224]
Basic controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Child’s household income Yes Yes Yes Yes
Mother’s characteristics Yes Yes Yes
Father’s characteristics Yes Yes
Relationship characteristics Yes
R2 0:006 0:080 0:092 0:164 0:173 0:221
N 985 985 985 985 985 985
Notes: a Robust standard errors reported in brackets [-]. b Statistical signiﬁcance reported: ¤ = 5%
level, and + = 10% level. c Sets of controls (not included unless indicated): “Basic controls” include
parents’ relationship status at childbirth, child gender, low birth weight, birth order, and mother’s state
of residence at childbirth; “Mother’s/Father’s characteristics” include age < 20, race/ethnicity, foreign-
born, education, working, weekly hours of work, and labor income; “Relationship characteristics”
includes father is younger than mother, both parents are white, both parents are Hispanic, both parents
are of other race/ethnicity, mother is white (not father), mother is black (not father), mother is Hispanic
(not father), mother is of other race/ethnicity (not father), mother is foreign-born (not father), father
is foreign-born (not mother), both parents are foreign-born, father is less educated than mother, father
is more educated than mother, length of time parents’ had known each other before pregnancy, father
suggested abortion during pregnancy, mother’s PPVT score, mother is catholic, mother has no religious
afﬁliation, mother attends religious activities frequently, prenatal smoking (mother), prenatal drinking
(mother), mother works (not father), father works (not mother), both parents work, each parents’ hours
of work per week, mother’s labor income exceeds father’s, and maternal grandmother’s education.TABLE 4
Probit Estimates of the Propensity Score
Coefﬁcient Robust Standard Error P > jzj
Child is of low birth weight (< 88 oz) ¡0:036 0:180 [0:840]
Child is female 0:022 0:103 [0:831]
Child’s birth order (mother):
- (Ref: 1st)
- 2nd 0:138 0:131 [0:294]
- 3rd or higher 0:182 0:147 [0:217]
Mother’s age < 20 ¡0:208 0:153 [0:171]
Father’s age < 20 ¡0:192 0:210 [0:361]
Father is younger than mother ¡0:058 0:140 [0:678]
Parents’ race/ethnicity:
- (Ref: both black)
- both white 0:236 0:193 [0:222]
- both Hispanic 0:602 0:198 [0:002]
- both other 0:049 0:571 [0:931]
- mother is white, father is non-white ¡0:033 0:250 [0:894]
- mother is black, father is non-black ¡0:617 0:530 [0:244]
- mother is Hispanic, father is non-Hispanic ¡0:460 0:255 [0:071]
- mother is other, father is non-other 0:199 0:659 [0:763]
Parents’ region of birth:
- (Ref: both U.S.)
- mother is foreign-born, father is not 0:264 0:374 [0:481]
- father is foreign-born, mother is not 0:108 0:178 [0:543]
- both parents are foreign-born 0:489 0:266 [0:066]
Mother’s education:
- (Ref: less than HS)
- H.S. diploma / GED ¡0:399 0:210 [0:057]
- some college ¡0:588 0:342 [0:086]
- bachelor & beyond ¡0:857 0:553 [0:121]
Father’s education:
- (Ref: less than HS)
- H.S. diploma / GED 0:291 0:203 [0:152]
- some college 0:509 0:341 [0:135]
- bachelor & beyond 1:917 0:554 [0:001]
(Continued)TABLE 4
Probit Estimates of the Propensity Score
Coefﬁcient Robust Standard Error P > jzj
Father’s education relative to mother’s:
- (Ref: same)
- less 0:463 0:236 [0:050]
- more ¡0:335 0:230 [0:145]
Child’s household income:
- (Ref: less than $10;000)
- between $10;000 and $24;999 0:010 0:163 [0:950]
- at least $25;000 ¡0:020 0:170 [0:904]
Parents’ labor force participation:
- (Ref: neither parents work)
- both parents work ¡0:356 0:513 [0:488]
- only mother works ¡0:137 0:622 [0:825]
- only father works 0:062 0:216 [0:775]
Mother’s weekly hours of work 0:013 0:013 [0:311]
Father’s weekly hours of work 0:007 0:003 [0:042]
Mother’s labor income exceeds father’s ¡0:087 0:391 [0:824]
Length of parents’ relationship
before pregnancy:
- (Ref: more than 2 years)
- less than 6 months 0:354 0:163 [0:030]
- 6 months to 1 year ¡0:202 0:171 [0:238]
- 1 to 2 years 0:113 0:129 [0:378]
Mother is catholic ¡0:190 0:153 [0:212]
Mother has no religious afﬁliation ¡0:005 0:160 [0:973]
Mother attends religious activities frequently 0:472 0:136 [0:001]
Father suggested abortion during pregnancy ¡0:045 0:154 [0:770]
Maternal grandmother attained more
than a high school education 0:125 0:135 [0:354]
Prenatal smoking (mother) 0:248 0:132 [0:060]
Prenatal drinking (mother) ¡0:464 0:206 [0:024]
Parents in visiting relationship at childbirth ¡0:486 0:128 [0:000]
Mother’s PPVT score (Year 3) 0:015 0:006 [0:006]
Constant ¡3:139 0:569 [0:000]
Log Likelihood = ¡420
Pseudo R2 = 0:174
N = 958 (Treated = 192; Control = 766)
Notes: a Additional controls for “mother’s state of residence at childbirth” (14 state dummies) omitted




































Block 1 Block 2 Block 3 Block 4 Block 5 Block 6
C T C T C T C T C T C TTABLE 5
Effect of Parents’ Marriage after Childbirth on Child PPVT Score at Age 3 (PSM)
Matching S.E. N Treated N Controls % Matched Treated
Estimate
Epanechnikov Kernel
Bandwidth = 0:01 3.500¤ 1:717 192 766 100
Bandwidth = 0:005 4.366¤ 1:791 192 766 100
Gaussian Kernel 3.610¤ 1:830 192 766 100
Radius
Radius = 0:01 3.524¤ 1:404 189 765 98
Radius = 0:005 3.914¤ 1:487 182 697 95
N Treated (Total)= 192
N Controls (Total)= 766
Notes: a Standard errors are obtained by bootstrap with 500 replications. b Propensity score is re-
estimated at each replication of the bootstrap procedure to account for the uncertainty associated with
the estimation of the propensity score; c Estimated propensity score in region of common support
[0:02025512;0:77094784], which is deﬁned by the minimum estimated propensity score within the
treatment group, and the maximum estimated propensity score within the control group; d The propen-
sity score is estimated using a probit model with the same ﬁve sets of controls as employed in Model (5)
in Table 3 (refer to the notes in Table 3 and the explanation in the text for details); e Refer to Appendix
Table 1 for details of tests of the “balancing properties” between the treated and controls with respect
to each covariate.TECHNICAL APPENDIX
Matching Estimators
Let T andC be the set of treated and untreated individuals, respectively. The observed outcome of a
treated individual be denoted YT
i , and YC
j denotes the observed outcome of an individual in the control
group. Let C(i) be the set of control individuals matched to the treated individual i with an estimated
propensity score pi.
In general, the Kernel matching matched all treated observations with a weighted average of all
control observations with weights that are inversely proportional to the distance between the propensity











where K(¢) is a kernel function and hn is a bandwidth parameter. In this study we consider three
matching estimators, namely Uniform (also known as the “radius” matching estimator), Epanechinikov,
and Gaussian kernels, each uses a speciﬁc kernel function:
² Epanechinikov: K(u) = (3=4)(1¡u)2 for juj < 1, and 0 otherwise
² Gaussian: K(u) = (1=
p
2p)exp[¡u2=2] for all u
² Uniform (Radius): K(u) = 1=2 for juj < 1 and 0 otherwise








is a consistent estimator of the counterfactual outcome Y0i.
Choosing the Bandwidth
Silverman’s rule-of-thumb (1986) may be used to select the optimal bandwidth:
b h = 1:06£Minfb s;R=1:34g£n¡1
5
where b s = sample standard deviation, R = interquartile range (75th-quantile ¡ 25th-quantile), and n =
sample size. The method is based on the assumption that the underlying distribution of X (the propen-
sity score) is normally distributed. The rule-of-thumb will give reasonable results for all distributions
that are unimodal, fairly symmetric and do not have fat tails. However, the rule-of-thumb may not be
applicable in our case as the distribution of the estimated propensity score is far from normal (see Ap-
pendix Figure 1). As a result, the bandwidth suggested by the rule-of-thumb may be far from optimal.
If the choice of bandwidth is too large, the treated and their matches tend to differ more on observable
characteristics. As a result, the matching estimates tend to converge to that produced by the OLS. Our
matching estimates using the bandwidth suggested by the rule-of-thumb (b h ¼ 0:040) is very close tothe OLS estimates. Hence, we choose smaller bandwidth(s) (0:010 and 0:005) to ensure closer matches
between the treated and controls are used in the estimation.
Robustness Analysis
Relaxing the Common Support Condition. Our estimates are based on observations with propensity
scores falling within the common support, to ensure that there are sufﬁcient overlap between the treated
and control units to enhance comparability, which may improvethe quality of our estimates. A potential
drawback of imposing the common support restriction is that high quality matches may be lost at the
boundaries of the common support and the sample may be considerably reduced. Hence imposing the
common support restrictions is not necessarily better (Lechner 2001). Imposing the common support
condition results in 87 control and 6 treated units being dropped from our main analysis. To ensure
that our estimates are sensitive to the inclusion of these observations, we relax the common support
condition and re-estimate the ATET using all 1;051 observations.
Appendix Figure 2 presents the box plot of the propensity score overlap for this sample. For treated
individuals with high propensity scores (Block 7), there are no suitable controls (no overlap). In this
case, treated observations with high propensity scores are potentially matched with control observations
that are substantially different. This is particularly problematic for matching estimators that place
positive weights on these “poor matches”, such as the Gaussian kernel.42 Overall, with the exception of
the Gaussian kernel estimate, the ATET estimates obtained by relaxing the common support condition
are similar to our main results (results available upon request).
Assessing the Conditional Independence Assumption. Anidentifyingassumptionofthematchingmethod,
namely CIA, requires that conditional on the observables, the distribution of the potential outcomes of
the treated group in the absence of treatment is identical to the outcome distribution of the controls.
Yet since the data are uninformative about the distribution of potential outcomes for the treated group
in the absence of treatment, they cannot directly reject the CIA. Imbens (2004) proposes an indirect
way of assessing its plausibility, relying on estimating a causal effect that is known to be zero. Speciﬁ-
cally, the test involves estimating the causal effect of the treatment on a lagged outcome, with its value
determined prior to the treatment itself. If it is not zero, this implies that the underlying conditional
distribution of the potential outcomes of the treated under no treatment is not comparable to control
outcomes.43
We estimate the “causal” effect of parents’ marriage after childbirth on the child’s birth weight.
A child’s birth weight is realized before the treatment can take place, and potentially correlated with
the child’s subsequent development. All of our matching estimates show that parents’ marriage has no
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